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This paper considers whether minimum wage is a well-targeted anti-poverty policy by 
examining the backgrounds of minimum-wage workers, and whether raising the 
minimum wage reduces employment for unskilled workers. An examination of micro 
data from a large-scale government household survey, the Employment Structure Survey 
(Shugyo Kozo Kihon Chosa), reveals that about half of minimum-wage workers belong to 
households with annual incomes of more than 5 million yen as a non-head of household. 
A regression analysis indicates that an increase in the minimum wage moderately reduces 
the employment of male teenagers and middle-aged, married females, while it encourages 
the employment of high school age youth.  
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1.  Introduction 
  The media recently have been attracting public attention to poverty issues in 
Japan. Indeed, in 1999 about 8 percent of households were below the poverty threshold, 
which is the government criterion for eligibility for livelihood assistance, as reported by 
Komamura (2003).
2 Whether or not to raise the minimum wage is vigorously debated as a 
possible way to alleviate the situation of the poor. With heightened public interest on  
minimum wage as a background, the new minimum-wage legislation enacted in 
November 2007 requires the government to consider the level of livelihood assistance 
when determining the minimum wage. The passage of this new legislation paved the way 
for increasing the minimum wage. 
  Economists have long discussed whether raising the minimum wage is an 
effective policy option to alleviate poverty and have tended to take a negative attitude 
toward it as a variation of price intervention. This discussion dates back to the early 20
th 
century,
3  and a classical work by Stigler (1946) viewed the minimum wage as an 
ineffective antipoverty policy because minimum-wage workers do not necessarily belong 
to poor households, and it could reduce the employment of unskilled workers. Whether 
minimum-wage workers belong to poor households continued to be evaluated by Card 
                                                        
2 Komamura (2003) estimates that among households presumably eligible for livelihood assistance, only 
18.5 percent actually received the assistance. 
3 See Neumark and Wascher (2008) for the history of economic thought on the minimum wage. 3 
 
and Krueger (1995), Burkhauser et al. (1996), and Neumark and Wascher (2008), who 
concluded that in the U.S. a non-negligible fraction of minimum-wage workers belong to 
non-poor households. The minimum wage’s negative impact on employment has been 
widely studied in the U.S., and the evidence is reviewed in Brown et al. (1983), Card and 
Krueger (1995), Kennan (1995), Brown (1999), and Neumark and Wascher (2008). 
Although the influential book by Card and Krueger (1995) changed the way economists 
think about the minimum wage’s role in a labor market that is not perfectly competitive, 
as evidenced by Manning (2003), economists’ general attitude toward the minimum wage 
continues to be skeptical because of its negative impact on employment and its potential 
to reduce opportunities for skill formation, as represented by Neumark and Wascher 
(2008).  
  In spite of intense interest in the role of the minimum wage in Japan,  not much is 
known about minimum-wage workers and whether raising the minimum wage would 
decrease employment. Abe and Tanaka (2007), Abe and Tamada (2008), and 
Kambayashi, Kawaguchi, and Yamada (2009) consistently pointed out that the minimum 
wage has a significant impact on the wage distribution, particularly on part-time workers 
in rural areas. These findings may give the impression that raising the minimum wage is 
an effective anti-poverty policy; however, Tachibanaki and Urakawa (2007) reported that 4 
 
a large portion of minimum-wage workers are not household heads and such workers tend 
to belong to wealthier households than non-minimum-wage workers, based on Japan’s 
General Social Survey, 2000-2002, with annual sample size around one thousand. 
  Evidence regarding the effect of minimum wage on employment is still mixed. 
Kawaguchi (2009) did not find systematic evidence of employment loss caused by an 
increase in the real value of minimum wage based on time-series data that covered 
1983-2006. Exploiting regional variation in the real value of minimum wage, 
Tachibanaki and Urakawa (2007) did not find evidence of employment loss caused by a 
high minimum wage based on prefecture-level, cross-sectional household data from 
2002; while Yugami (2005) found a positive correlation between the unemployment rate 
and the minimum wage based on prefecture-level census data from 2000. Ariga (2007) 
found that a higher prefectural minimum wage increased the wages of high-school 
graduates and suppressed new job openings for them based on prefecture-level, 
cross-sectional data from the Employment Service Bureau of the Ministry of Labor and 
Health. None of the above studies exploited prefecture-level panel data to estimate the 
effect of minimum wage on employment, allowing for prefecture unobserved 
heterogeneity. However, an unobserved macro shock could be correlated with the time 
series change of the minimum wage, or a regional, unobserved heterogeneity could be 5 
 
correlated with the level of the regional minimum wage. Thus, controlling for both an 
unobserved macro shock and unobserved, prefecture heterogeneity using prefecture-level 
panel data is indispensable. Kambayashi, Kawaguchi, and Yamada (2009) explored 
1997-2002 prefecture-level panel data and using a fixed-effects estimation
4 found that a 
higher real value of the minimum wage reduces employment for young men below age 22 
and women between the ages of 31 and 59.  
  The purpose of this paper is to examine the backgrounds of minimum-wage 
workers and minimum wage’s effect on employment, as well as schooling decisions, 
based on micro data from the Employment Status Survey (ESS) between 1982 and 2002. 
The analysis reveals that about 4 percent to 10 percent of male workers and 22 percent to 
41 percent of female workers were employed at the minimum wage in 2002, while the 
corresponding numbers were about 3 percent to 6 percent for males and 22 percent to 36 
percent for females in 1982. An examination of minimum-wage workers’ backgrounds 
reveals that about half of them belong to households with an annual income of more than 
5 million yen as a non-head of household. 
  The variation in the fraction of workers affected by a minimum-wage hike 
                                                        
4 Using another approach, Kawaguchi and Yamada (2008) analyzed a panel of individuals and found that 
those low-wage workers who are directly affected by minimum-wage hikes are more likely to lose their 
jobs after minimum-wage hikes, allowing for individual fixed effects. 
 6 
 
resulting from the heterogeneity of wage distributions across prefectures is exploited to 
evaluate the effect of a federal minimum-wage increase on employment across states. The 
estimation results indicate that a minimum-wage hike decreases employment among 
teenage males and middle-aged, married females. Its magnitude is small for teenage 
males, but moderate for middle-aged, married females. An analysis of schooling and 
employment choices among high school age teenagers indicates that an increase in the 
real minimum-wage level encourages youths to work and induces them to drop out of 
high school. The findings show that higher minimum wages reduce the employment rate 
of teenage youth while encouraging employment of high school age youth. The 
combination of these two factors implies that the minimum-wage hike negatively affects 
high school graduates’ labor market prospects. 
  This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the institutional 
background of the minimum-wage system. Section 3 explains the data and the time-series 
trend of the minimum wage. Section 4 examines the background of minimum-wage 
workers and considers whether a minimum-wage hike helps poor households. Section 5 
evaluates the minimum wage’s effect on employment. Section 6 reports the minimum 
wage’s effect on the choices of 16- and 17-year olds. The last section derives conclusions. 
 7 
 
2.  Institutional Background 
  The minimum wage in Japan became statutory in 1959. There are two distinct 
minimum wage systems: a regional minimum wage set by prefectures that applies to all 
workers, and an industry minimum wage that is applied on top of the regional minimum 
wage to workers in specific industries in specific prefectures. This paper focuses only on 
the regional minimum wage because the industrial minimum wage does not have 
extensive coverage and is gradually being abolished,
5 and the specific industries that the 
industrial minimum wages are defined for cannot be exactly matched to the industry 
codes in the data.  
The regional minimum wages are determined by the following process. First, a 
national council on minimum wage, which consists of members representing the public 
interest (retired bureaucrats and academics), employers, and employees (union leaders), 
provides "criteria (meyasu)" for minimum-wage increases for four distinct regional 
blocks that include all 47 prefectures divided roughly by wage level. Second, local 
minimum wage councils deliberate and decide their own minimum-wage levels, but the 
criteria suggested by the national council have a significant influence on the local 
                                                        
5 The report by Saitei Chingin no Arikata Kenkyukai (minimum wage study group) of the Ministry of Health, Labor and 
Welfare (2005) issued a recommendation for the revision of industrial minimum wage, including a possibility of its 
abolishment. In the fiscal year 2000, 4.5 million workers were covered by industry minimum wage while 52 million 
workers were covered by regional minimum wage according to the press release of the ministry of labor and welfare on 
January 25 in 2001. 8 
 
councils’ final decisions. In the national council’s negotiations, the opinions of 
representatives of the public interest are conclusively important because there are always 
conflicts between the representatives of employees and employers that make it very 
difficult to reach a unanimous agreement on the amount of a minimum-wage increase. In 
this situation, the opinions of council members representing the public interest are 
respected as a means of reaching an agreement, even though these opinions seem to be 
strongly affected by a rate of average wage increase that is based on a government 
establishment survey implemented for the purpose of minimum-wage determination.
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3.  Minimum Wage Variables and Data 
  This study utilizes the Employment Status Survey (ESS, Shugyo Kozo Kihon 
Chosa) from the years 1982, 1987, 1992, 1997, and 2002. The ESS is conducted every 
five years on household members age 15 or older from a sample of approximately 
440,000 households that is representative of the complete population. The survey collects 
information on household members and each member’s labor force status on October 1 of 
each survey year. The file contains about 1 million individuals, with equal numbers of 
males and females, for each year the survey is conducted. 
                                                        
6 Chingin Kettei Joukyo Chosa [Survey of Current Wage Determination] by the Ministry of Health and 
Labor. This survey takes place every June and samples about 10,000 establishments in manufacturing, 
wholesale and retail, restaurants, and service industries that hire no more than 30 employees.  9 
 
  Two variables are defined to express the value of minimum wages in relation to 
wage distributions in regional labor markets: the fraction of minimum-wage workers 
(FMW) and the Kaiz index. FMW is defined as the percentage of workers earning the 
minimum wage or less out of all employed workers.  
  Information regarding the minimum wage by prefecture is obtained from the 
Pandect of Minimum Wage Determination (Saitei Chingin Kettei Yoran). While the 
minimum wage is basically provided as an hourly rate,
7  the survey only records 
individuals’ annual earnings in ranges. To compare annual earnings with the minimum 
wage, we calculate minimum wage annual income, which is defined as the annual 
earnings of an individual if he works at the minimum wage all year, as the product of 
minimum wage by weekly work hours and the annual number of workdays divided by 5.
8 
Because annual work-days and weekly work hours are also reported in ranges, we 
construct two different ranges of minimum-wage earnings by assigning a maximum and 
minimum value to one range bracket for work-days and one range bracket for weekly 
work hours.
9 The actual minimum-wage earnings should lie between the two different 
                                                        
7 Until 2002, minimum wage was also defined by daily wage as well as hourly wage, but this was abolished 
after 2002. 
8 5 is the number of week-days. 
9 The ranges of annual workdays are: less than 50, 50-99, 100-149, 150-199, 200-249, and 250 and above 
for all survey years. The ranges of work hours are: less than 15, 15-21, 22-34, 35-42, 43-48, 49-59, and 60 
and above for 1987; less than 15, 15-21, 22-34, 35-42, 43-45, 46-48, 49-59, and 60 and above for 1992; less 
than 15, 15-21, 22-34, 35-42, 43-48, 49-59, and 60 and above for 1997; less than 15, 15-19, 20-21, 22-34, 
35-42, 43-48, 49-59, and 60 and above for 2002. For the lowest and highest bracket ranges of annual 
workdays, 0 and 260 days are assigned, respectively. For the lowest and highest bracket ranges of weekly 10 
 
minimum-wage earnings levels used here. The annual earnings, also reported in ranges, 
are defined as the minimum value of a range bracket.
10  A minimum-wage worker is 
defined as a worker earning less than the minimum-wage earnings. FMW is defined as the 
number of minimum-wage workers divided by the number of employed workers. The 
FMW using the maximum and minimum values of workdays and work hours are called 
the fraction-of-minimum-wage-workers minimum (FMW, min) and the 
fraction-of-minimum-wage-workers maximum (FMW, max), respectively. In the above 
process, workers working less than 200 days in a year on irregular work schedules, which 
consist of around 12% of the sample, are dropped because the survey does not record their 
work hours and workdays. This data limitation may underestimate FMW if those workers 
working limited days without a regular work schedule are more likely to receive 
minimum wages than the workers working on regular schedules. Self-employed workers 
and family workers are also excluded from the sample because they are not covered by 
the minimum wage law. 
The Kaiz index is defined as the minimum wage divided by the average wage at 
                                                                                                                                                                    
work hours, 0 and 80 are assigned, respectively. 
10 The annual income ranges denominated by thousand yen are: less than 500, 500-990, 1,000-1,490, 
1,500-1,990, 2,000-2,490, 2,500-2,990, 3,000-3,990, 4,000-4,990, 5,000-5,990, 6,000-6,990, 7,000-7,990, 
8,000-8,990, 9,000-9,900, 10,000-14,900, and 15,000 or above for year 2002. The ranges for 1992 and 
1997 are: less than 500, 500-990, 1,000-1,490, 1,500-1,990, 2,000-2,490, 2,500-2,990, 3,000-3,990, 
4,000-4,990, 5,000-6,990, 7,000-9,900, 10,000-14,900, and 15,000 or above. The ranges for 1987 and 1982 
are: less than 500, 500-990, 1,000-1,490, 1,500-1,990, 2,000-2,490, 2,500-2,990, 3,000-3,990, 4,000-4,990, 
5,000-6,990, 7,000-9,900, and 10,000 or above. To compare annual income with each year, this study 
integrates income ranges of 5 years with that of 1982. 11 
 
an hourly rate. The average hourly wage is determined from prefecture-level data from 
the Basic Survey on Wage Structure (BSWS) because hourly wage can be precisely 
calculated from monthly hours of work and earnings based on payroll records.
11 We 
calculate the average wage at an hourly rate as the scheduled monthly wage divided by 
the scheduled monthly hours of work. While both FMW and Kaiz variables measure the 
value of the minimum wage as it relates to wage distributions, the two measures exploit 
different information: FMW exploits information from the lower part of the wage 
distribution relative to the minimum wage, while the Kaiz index captures the mean of the 
wage distribution relative to the minimum wage. Thus, it is possible for the Kaiz index to 
be low even if FMW is high when the wage distribution has a fat right tail. 
 
4.  Characteristics of Minimum-Wage Workers 
  Table 1 reports the breakdown of minimum-wage workers by education, sex, and 
age categories. The FMW among junior-high and high-school graduates is higher than 
that among college graduates. Both younger and older workers are more likely to be 
minimum-wage workers. It is also notable that the FMWs increased in all categories, 
                                                        
11 The Japanese government conducts the Basic Survey on Wage Structure (BSWS) annually. This survey 
includes observations randomly chosen from almost all regions and industries, except agriculture, in Japan. 
The establishments in the sample, which are randomly chosen in proportion to the size of prefectures, have 
10 or more employees in either the private or public sectors, or belong to private firms with 5 to 9 
employees. Employees are also randomly selected from among the establishments included in this survey. 
This study uses prefecture-level data disclosed by the Japanese government. 12 
 
from 1982 to 2002. Table 2 indicates the FMWs and the Kaiz index by prefectures. Both 
the FMW and the Kaiz tend to be high in rural areas. Figures 1A and 1B show the 
histograms of annual earnings normalized by the minimum value, defined as: (Annual 
earnings - the minimum value of minimum wage earnings) / the minimum value of 
minimum wage earnings. We clearly confirm that the minimum wage is much more 
relevant to the wage distribution in a low-wage prefecture (Okinawa) than in a high-wage 
prefecture (Tokyo). 
  Table 3 reports FMW by industry and indicates that FMWs in the 
wholesale-and-retail-trade and accommodation-eating-drinking industries increased from 
1982 to 2002. Table 3 also indicates that part-time workers are more likely to be 
minimum-wage workers than regular workers. Workers in smaller firms are more likely 
to be minimum-wage workers than workers in larger firms. 
Table 4 examines whether minimum-wage workers belong to low-income 
families. We classify minimum-wage workers by the status of their head-of-household 
and six annual household income categories (in thousands of yen): less than 1,000, 
1,000-1,990, 2,000-2,990, 3,000-3,990, 4,000-4,990, and 5,000 and above. Table 4 
tabulates the distribution of household income among minimum-wage workers and 
non-minimum-wage workers. As far as heads-of-households are concerned, 13 
 
minimum-wage workers are more likely to belong to low-income households than 
non-minimum-wage workers. However, around 70 percent of minimum-wage workers 
are not household heads. As shown in Column (4), the household heads of low-income 
families whose annual income is less than 3 million yen comprised only around 15% of 
minimum-wage workers in 2002. The major segment of minimum-wage workers (around 
50% in 2002) belongs to middle- and high-income families (over 5 million yen) as a 
non-head-of-household. 
Table 5 reports the composition of minimum-wage workers with respect to sex, 
age and level of education. We can see that junior-high and high-school graduates and 
middle-aged women (30-59 years old) are more likely to be minimum-wage workers. In 
particular, more than a half of minimum-wage workers are middle-aged women, many 
of whom may be part-time workers. 
The nationwide data in Figure 2 show that the Kaiz index and FMW variables 
move together in 1982-2002. Figure 3 includes the results of three typical prefectures: 
Aomori and Okinawa (low-wage prefectures) and Tokyo (high-wage prefecture). Both 
the FMW and Kaiz index are high in Aomori and Okinawa but low in Tokyo, as 
mentioned before. The time trends in the three prefectures are similar to the nationwide 
trend, but the magnitude of the variation differs across prefectures.  14 
 
Figure 4 illustrates the FMW among junior-high and high-school graduates by 
four different age categories and sex. Figure 4A indicates that younger male workers, 
especially teenagers, tend to be minimum-wage workers, but few male workers in the 
25-59 age group are. The FMW is high among females regardless of age, as reported in 
Figure 4B. Both Figures 4A and 4B report that the FMW among young workers increased 
from 1992 to 2002. 
 
5.  Minimum Wage’s Effect on Employment 
  We empirically investigate the effect of minimum wage on the employment of 
workers who are more likely to be affected by a minimum-wage hike. The analysis in the 
previous section reveals that a large percentage of youth, elderly, and married females 
receives wages near the minimum wage. To restrict our analysis to the demographic 
groups that are presumably heavily affected by the minimum wage, we focus on the 
following seven categories of workers: male teenagers (15-19 years old), male young 
adults (20-24 years old), male elderly (over 60 years old), female teenagers, female young 
adults, female elderly, and middle-aged (25-59 years old) married females. 
  To establish the causal effect of a minimum-wage hike on employment, we 
examine the relation between the fraction of workers who are affected by the 15 
 
minimum-wage hike and the change in employment using prefecture-level variation. 
More specifically, we calculate the fraction of workers who are affected by a 
minimum-wage hike (Fraction Affected, FA), in other words, workers whose wage is 
above the current minimum wage but below the revised minimum wage. This FA takes 
different values across prefectures, even if the amounts of the minimum-wage hike are 
homogeneous across prefectures, because the minimum-wage hike is more prevalent in 
the low wage prefectures, such as Okinawa, than in high wage prefectures like Tokyo. 
Card (1992) originally proposed using  the FA variable to examine the effect of the federal 
minimum-wage increase on employment, because the uniform increase of the minimum 
wage across states has different impacts across states depending on each state’s wage 
distribution.  
  The following model is estimated to examine the effect of FA on the change in 
the employment rate of worker group k in prefecture i between years t and t-5:    












t i e Y X AW FA E + + Δ + Δ + Δ − γ β β β β ＋ ＝  
where
k
t i E , Δ  is the change in the employment rate of category k in prefecture i between 
years t and t-5;  5 , − t i FA  is the fraction of workers who are affected by the minimum-wage 
hike between   t   and   t-5;  t i AW , Δ  is the change in the average wage of middle-aged (25-59 
years old) male workers; 
k
t i X ,  is a set of explanatory variables (the proportion of the 16 
 
population in the relevant categories and the unemployment rate of middle-aged males); 
and  t Y  is a set of dummy variables for year t. We adopt two definitions of FA: FA_min 




5 it it it MWincome Income MWIncome < ≤ − − . The minimum of the minimum-wage 
annual income, 
min
it MWIncome , is calculated using the hourly minimum wage and the 
minimum value of annual work hours. FA_max is similarly defined based on the 
maximum of minimum-wage annual income. Card and Krueger (1995) claimed that an 
increase in the average wage relative to output price causes firms to cut employment 
through a reduction in output production. We control this scale effect by including the 
change in the average adult male’s wage ( t i AW , ) and the year dummy variables as 
explanatory variables. The estimation method is weighted least squares (WLS), with the 
weight being  the inverse of the standard error of the dependent variable. 
  Table 6 reports the descriptive statistics for the regression analysis sample. The 
FA has a mean around 4%-6% with sufficient variation across years and prefectures. 
Table 7 displays the fraction of workers affected by a minimum-wage hike for a five-year 
period, and we can confirm that FA tends to be higher in rural, low-wage areas, such as 
Aomori and Okinawa, than in high-wage areas such as Tokyo. It also displays a variation 
over time within a prefecture.  17 
 
  To illustrate the regression results for subsamples, Figure 5A and 5B visually 
reports the regression results for male and female teenagers between 1997 and 2002. The 
fraction of workers affected by the minimum-wage hike (FA) on the horizontal axis is the 
residual from the regression of FA on other explanatory variables. Both figures confirm a 
weakly negative relation between regression-adjusted FA and the change in the 
employment rate over the five-year period. 
  Table 8 reports the comprehensive results of regressions by demographic groups. 
Table 8A Columns (1) and (2) indicate that the higher FA results in the reduction of the 
employment rate among male teenagers. A one-percent increase in FA reduces the 
employment rate by about 0.2 percentage point. Considering that the average 
employment rate of teenage males is around 16 percent (Table 6) and the average FA is 
around five percent, the magnitude is small. Columns (3) and (4) indicate the negative 
impact of higher FA on the employment rate of young adults, but the coefficients are not 
statistically significant. Higher FA does not affect the employment rate of elderly people. 
  Table 8B reports the results for females. The estimated coefficients are 
consistently negative and some of the coefficients are statistically significant. However, 
all results depend on the choice of FA variable, and it is rather difficult to see a clear 
relation between FA and the employment rate from this table. Table 8C reports the results 18 
 
for married females in the 25-59 age group who are likely to be employed as part-time 
workers. The estimated coefficients clearly indicate that the minimum-wage hike reduces 
employment among members of this group. A one-percent increase in FA decreases the 
employment rate by 0.4-0.8 percentage point. Considering the average of FA is around 
five percent and the employment rate of this group is roughly 66 percent, the magnitude is 
rather moderate.   
  
6.  Minimum Wage’s Effect on the Choices of Youth, Ages 16-17 
  The effects of minimum wage on the outcomes of youths are not limited to 
employment but also include schooling decisions. Cunningham (1981) and Ehrenberg 
and Marcus (1980) examined this subject by arguing that the minimum wage’s effect on 
schooling decisions is complex because it affects both the opportunity cost of schooling 
and the return to schooling. The opportunity cost of attending high school is the wage that 
high-school-age youth expect to receive in the labor market. If the employment-reduction 
effect is limited, then a minimum-wage hike may increase the expected wage; in contrast, 
with a significant employment-reduction effect the expected wage may decrease. 
Minimum wage also affects the return to schooling through a modification of the wage 
structure. If the minimum wage reduces the labor demand for low-skilled workers, it may 19 
 
increase the demand for skilled workers through a substitution effect, which may lead to a 
higher return to education. In our context, an increased minimum wage may reduce the 
demand for part-time jobs among high-school students or high-school dropouts, and 
increase the demand for high-school graduates. If a minimum-wage increase does not 
reduce employment, however, even high-school dropouts can earn a higher wage and are 
therefore less likely to return to education because of the minimum-wage increase. 
Overall, minimum wage has a complex effect on high-school age youths’ schooling 
decisions through the opportunity cost of attending high school and the relative value of 
returning to high school to receive a diploma.  
  In addition, Ehrenberg and Marcus (1982) emphasized the importance of 
household liquidity constraints. If a youth belongs to a household that is 
liquidity-constrained, she may finance her studies by working part-time. In this scenario, 
increasing the minimum wage may reduce employment as well as school attendance. 
These theoretical complexities suggest the importance of treating youths’ decisions about 
schooling and employment jointly. 
  This section investigates the minimum wage’s effect on young people's choice 
between employment and school enrollment. We focus on high-school age individuals, 
16 and 17 years old, and classify them into the following exclusive categories to capture 20 
 
the possible joint decision of schooling and employment: (a) not in school and not 
employed, (b) in school and not employed, (c) in school and employed, and (d) not in 
school and employed. The empirical model used in this section is the aggregate data 
version of Neumark and Wascher (1995), which is the same model that was used in the 
previous section except for the dependent variables. As in the employment analysis, we 
exploit the prefectural variation of the fraction of workers affected by the minimum-wage 
hike. The estimation model is described as follows:  














t i p ,  is the population of each category k divided by the relevant-aged population in 
prefecture i and year t; FA is the fraction of workers affected by the minimum-wage hike 
in the five-year period; and AW, X, and the other variables are the same as in the previous 
section. The estimation method is weighted least squares (WLS), in which the inverses of 
the standard errors of the dependent variables are used as weights. The above model is 
estimated based on a sample that includes only young people 16 and 17 years old. Some 
15 and18 year olds are also high-school age depending on the quarter of their birth, but 
the birth quarter is not recorded before the 1997 survey; therefore, we cannot restrict the 
sample to include 15 and 18 year olds.  
  Table 9 reports the summary statistics of the analysis sample for the choice of 21 
 
youths. Around 93 percent of 16-17 year-old youths are in school without employment, 
while 2.5 percent are in school and work part-time jobs. Of the remaining five percent, 
more than three percent are out of school and employed while 2 percent are idle.  
  Table 10 presents the estimation results. For all estimations, the changes in 
proportions of youth who are in school but not employed are treated as the base category. 
Panel A reports the regression results using the fraction of workers who are affected by 
the minimum-wage changes as an independent variable. The change in the fraction of 
workers who are affected by a minimum-wage hike is defined by a range as in the 
previous analysis, because the definition of minimum-wage workers depends on whether 
we use the minimum hours of work or the maximum hours of work to define 
minimum-wage annual income. Columns (1) and (2) report the effect of the fraction 
affected on the change in the fraction of workers who are out of school and not employed. 
Regardless of the measurement of the fraction of workers affected by the minimum-wage 
hike, the minimum-wage hike did not significantly change the fraction of youths in this 
category. Columns (3) and (4) show that the fraction of youths who were employed while 
attending school increased when the minimum-wage hike affected more workers. To 
quantify its impact, let us think about the counterfactual situation that Okinawa did not 
increase its minimum wage between 1997 and 2002, and the fraction affected was zero 22 
 
instead of the actual 4.54 percent reported in Table 7. The coefficient estimate is 0.30 
(Column (4)); thus the estimated effect on the increase in the probability of the choice to 
stay in school and be employed decreases by 1.359 percentage points. This is a large 
effect, given that only 2.5 percent of youths work while attending school (Table 9). 
Columns (5) and (6) report that the increase in the fraction of workers affected by a 
minimum-wage hike increases the probability of youths to be out of school and employed. 
The estimated magnitude is about one third of the effect on the choice of being in school 
and employed.  
  Overall, the higher the fraction of workers who are affected by the 
minimum-wage hike, the higher the fraction of youths in employment, either while 
attending high school or dropping out of high school. In particular, estimates indicate that 
a higher minimum wage relative to the regional wage distribution encourages high-school 
students to work as part-time workers. An examination of the long-term consequence of 
the minimum wage on skill formation and labor-market outcomes, as conducted by 
Neumark and Nizalova (2007) for the US, remains unwarranted.. 
 
7.  Conclusion 
  This paper aimed to answer the following three questions based on Japanese data. 23 
 
First, do minimum-wage workers belong to low-income households? Second, what are 
the minimum wage’s effects on employment among populations that are marginally 
attached to the labor market? Third, what are the minimum wage’s effects on the 
employment and schooling choices of 16- and 17-year-olds?  
Five waves of the Employment Status Survey (ESS), from 1982, 1987, 1992, 
1997, and 2002, were used to calculate the percentage of workers earning the minimum 
wage. The annual earnings and work-hours reported in range brackets enabled us to 
calculate the minimum and maximum number of minimum-wage workers. The minimum 
fraction of minimum-wage workers was around 3%-4% between 1982 and 2002, while 
the maximum fraction was 6%-10% during the same period for males. The corresponding 
figures for females were around 22% and 36%-40%, respectively.  
Female workers, workers with low educational backgrounds, workers in rural 
areas, and workers in retail or food industries were more likely than others to be 
employed at the minimum–wage level. While workers with weaker labor-market 
characteristics were more likely to work at the minimum wage, those minimum-wage 
workers did not necessarily belong to disadvantaged households. In 2002, only around 20 
percent of minimum-wage workers were heads-of-households and about half of them 
belonged to households with annual incomes of 5 million yen or more as a non-household 24 
 
head. This result confirms the finding of Tachibanaki and Urakawa (2007) that was based 
on a much smaller dataset.  
The analysis results exploiting the cross-prefecture heterogeneity of the fraction 
of workers affected by a minimum-wage hike indicates that a minimum-wage hike 
reduces the employment of teenage males and middle-aged, married females. Its 
magnitude for teenage males is estimated to be small, but that for middle-aged married 
females is rather large.  
The analysis of the minimum wage’s effect on the choices of high-school age 
youths shows us that an increase in the minimum wage encourages employment for 
young people whether or not they are attending high school. While higher minimum wage 
relative to regional wage decreases teenage male employment, it positively affects the 
employment of high-school age youths. The combination of these two pieces of evidence 
implies that a minimum-wage increase relative to the regional wage distribution will have 
a strong negative impact on male high-school graduates. The minimum wage’s long-term 
effect on the skill formation and long-term labor-market outcomes of young people has 
yet to be examined. Overall, a rising minimum wage does not seem to be a powerful 
policy for alleviating poverty in Japan because it is not well targeted toward poor 
households and it reduces the employment of less-skilled workers. Adopting a more 25 
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12 Recent studies by Leigh (2009) and Rothstein (2008), however, report that the expansion of EITC 
suppresses the wages of low-skilled workers because it encourages their labor supply. 26 
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Table 1: Fraction of Minimum Wage Workers by Education, Sex, and Age categories. 
Year 1982  2002 










Education (%)         
Junior High School  14.92  24.37  18.47  33.47 
High School  9.17  16.79  13.48  26.20 
Junior College  7.09  13.57  11.56  23.93 
College  1.78  3.94  3.06  7.39 
        
Sex (%)         
Male   2.80  6.48  4.42  10.48 
15-19  26.47  44.31  38.95  61.78 
20-24  7.86  20.36  14.93  33.98 
25-29  2.40  6.91  4.69  14.58 
30-39  0.91  2.56  2.07  6.23 
40-49  0.70  2.06  1.39  3.93 
50-59  1.46  3.66  1.84  4.61 
60-  9.18  16.59  9.52  19.64 
Female  22.22  36.16  22.11  40.74 
15-19  27.74  43.84  48.86  71.02 
20-24  13.59  26.10  20.78  41.56 
25-29  14.79  25.22  13.38  29.23 
30-39  24.51  39.09  19.80  36.33 
40-49  24.70  40.34  22.52  42.02 
50-59  24.22  37.93  22.52  41.72 
60-  37.45  51.85  33.94  54.21 
Note: The fraction of minimum-wage workers is defined as the number of minimum-wage 
workers among all employed workers. Minimum-wage worker is defined if imputed 
minimum-wage annual earnings is below reported annual earnings. Imputed 
minimum-wage annual earnings is calculated in two ways: one based on the minimum 
values of workdays and work hours, and the other based on the maximum values of 
workdays and work hours. The minimum-wage worker defined by the former method is the 
minimum number of minimum-wage workers and the latter method is the maximum 
number of minimum-wage workers. Thus, the resulting fraction of minimum-wage workers 
has its bound ranging from FMW min to FMW max.  30
Table 2: Percent of Workers Earning less than the Minimum Wage and the Kaiz index.   

























Hokkaido  9.6  15.4  0.38 15.0  26.0 0.40 Shiga  8.4  14.7  0.35  9.8  20.5 0.36
Aomori  12.7  21.8  0.43 14.6  26.9 0.44 Kyoto  8.4  14.4  0.35  12.8 24.9 0.37
Iwate  13.2  22.9  0.42 13.7  25.4 0.44 Osaka  7.7  16.3  0.33  12.2 24.9 0.35
Miyagi  9.1  16.1  0.37 11.4  21.6 0.37 Hyogo  7.5  13.8  0.33  11.6 22.9 0.36
Akita  14.3  23.3  0.45 14.0  26.2 0.43 Nara  7.6  12.4  0.35  9.8  20.0 0.36
Yamagata  12.0  21.3  0.44 11.4  22.0 0.42 Wakayama 9.6  16.0  0.35  13.0 24.8 0.39
Fukushima  10.7  19.3  0.40 11.2  21.9 0.39 Tottori  10.4  18.4  0.44  10.3 20.0 0.41
Ibaraki  7.4  13.9  0.37 9.3  20.5 0.36 Shimane  12.7  20.3  0.42  10.2 20.4 0.42
Tochigi  9.1  16.4  0.37 11.7  23.4 0.37 Okayama  10.7  16.3  0.37  12.0 21.0 0.38
Gunma  9.9  17.1  0.38 12.0  23.9 0.38 Hiroshima  8.0  14.7  0.35  11.8 22.6 0.36
Saitama  7.1  13.0  0.35 10.8  22.5 0.37 Yamaguchi 9.8  16.3  0.36  12.5 23.2 0.40
Chiba  7.1  12.8  0.34 9.3  20.3 0.35 Tokushima 12.4  20.2  0.40  11.0 20.8 0.38
Tokyo  8.3  16.0  0.32 8.8  19.5 0.31 Kagawa  9.4  15.9  0.37  10.2 20.1 0.39
Kanagawa  6.7  13.6  0.32 9.2  19.9 0.35 Ehime  12.2  20.6  0.38  12.5 22.9 0.38
Niigata  10.2  19.2  0.42 11.2  21.2 0.42 Kochi  11.3  19.6  0.40  11.9 22.2 0.40
Toyama  9.8  15.9  0.38 9.8  19.4 0.40 Fukuoka  9.6  17.4  0.35  13.6 26.4 0.38
Ishikawa  10.4  17.4  0.39 11.0  23.4 0.40 Saga  11.5  20.0  0.42  13.0 24.8 0.42
Fukui  9.0  15.9  0.40 10.0  20.7 0.39 Nagasaki  11.1  18.9  0.38  14.1 25.8 0.41
Yamanashi  8.2  15.0  0.40 9.9  21.0 0.37 Kumamoto 12.5  22.3  0.41  15.0 28.0 0.41
Nagano  9.5  16.2  0.39 10.1  21.5 0.39 Oita  10.5  18.2  0.39  13.7 25.5 0.40
Gifu  9.5  17.7  0.40 13.5  25.4 0.41 Miyazaki  14.2  24.1  0.43  15.2 28.1 0.43
Shizuoka  9.2  15.4  0.37 10.9  23.6 0.39 Kagoshima 12.6  22.2  0.42  13.7 25.9 0.41
Aichi  8.9  15.3  0.35 11.4  22.6 0.36 Okinawa  14.0  23.5  0.36  19.2 33.6 0.44
Mie  10.7  17.5  0.37 12.9  24.6 0.37             
Note: The same note applies as in Table 1. Kaiz index is defined as a minimum wage divided 
by the average wage of 25-59 years old male workers.  31
Table 3: Percent of Workers Earning less than Minimum Wage.   
Year 1982  Year  2002 












Industry (%)           
Agriculture  22.30  34.63  Agriculture  28.92  44.77 
Forestry  3.55  7.59  Forestry  5.61  12.89 
Fishery  6.45  11.57  Fishery  12.50  24.88 
Mining  2.79  6.09  Mining  4.71  7.17 
Construction  5.11  11.85  Construction  5.92  13.13 
Manufacturing  11.54  18.89  Manufacturing  10.87  21.41 
Electricity, Gas, Heat Supply 
and Water 
14.98  26.67 
Electricity, Gas, Heat Supply 
and Water 













Wholesale, Retail Trade and 
Eating and Drinking 
2.17  5.04  Wholesale and Retail Trade  19.28  35.26 
Finance, Insurance, and Real 
Estate 
2.28  3.31 
Finance, Insurance, and Real 
Estate 
6.71  16.42 
Service  10.26  17.50 
Accommodation, Eating and 
Drinking 
29.61  52.37 
Government  3.22  5.31  Compound Service  5.28  12.83 
     Misc. Service  11.18  22.00 
     Government  1.90  5.57 
         
Employment Category (%)           
Regular  6.03  11.67  Regular  4.73  10.99 
Part-timer & Arubaito  45.43  71.25  Part-timer  36.99  68.37 
Contract Worker  12.43  21.48  Arubaito  36.78  62.00 
Misc.  21.48  33.54  Temporary Staff  10.58  29.04 
     Contract  Worker  9.85  24.84 
     Misc.  22.31  37.23 
        
Employer Size (%)           
1-4  24.84  36.93  1-4  25.19  38.55  32
5-9  16.11  26.99  5-9  17.53  31.24 
10-19  13.43  23.66  10-19  15.67  29.41 
20-29  12.68  22.57  20-29  14.26  28.31 
30-49  12.06  21.63  30-49  13.64  27.57 
50-99  10.98  19.94  50-99  12.05  25.55 
100-299  8.28  16.26  100-299  9.81  21.71 
300-499  6.03  12.56  300-499  8.32  18.67 
500-999  4.69  10.26  500-999  7.80  17.17 
1000-  3.16  6.45  1000-  7.55  16.24 
Government  3.29  5.52  Government  3.41  8.48 
Note: The same note applies as in Table 1.  33
Table 4: Household Background of Minimum Wage and Non Minimum Wage Workers   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Year 1982  2002 
Minimum  Wage  Worker?  No Yes No Yes 
Household Head      
-99 (10000 yen)  0.08 5.28 0.14 2.27 
-199    5.28 9.32 1.23 7.26 
-299    12.15  3.53 4.35 5.38 
-399    12.98  1.87 6.55 3.03 
-499    10.69  1.01 7.34 1.92 
500-    20.5 1.09  37.64  3.88 
Non-Household Head 
-99   0.01 0.77 0.02 0.43 
-199   0.59 5.73 0.19 1.98 
-299   2.67 14.69 0.83  5.09 
-399   5.09 17.77 1.96  8.5 
-499   7.00 15.35  3.1  9.72 
500-   22.97 23.56 36.66 50.54 
Note: Minimum-wage workers are the workers whose annual earnings (= minimum value of labor 
earnings bracket) is below minimum-wage annual earnings (= maximum or minimum annual hours of 
work * hourly minimum wage).    34
Table 5: Who are Minimum Wage Workers? 
Composition of Minimum Wage Workers by Education Level, Sex, and Age. 
Year 1982  2002 
Education (%)     
Junior High School  41.95 20.39 
High School  48.54 57.13 
Junior College  6.18 15.9 
College  3.18 6.52 
    
Sex by age groups (%)    
Male  24.54 26.54 
15-19  3.87 2.38 
20-24  6.75 5.99 
25-29  3.31 4.14 
30-39  2.94 3.51 
40-49  1.84 2.26 
50-59  2.35 2.87 
60-  3.49 5.4 
Female  75.46 73.46 
15-19  4.02 2.57 
20-24  9.29 7.62 
25-29  6.16 6.43 
30-39  19.69 13.28 
40-49  20.27 18.44 
50-59  11.28 17.35 
60-  4.75 7.77 
Note: The same note applies as in Table 4. 35
Table 6: Summary Statistics for the Employment Analysis Sample 
 Observations  Mean  SD  Min  Max 
Fraction Affected Minimum 
(FA_min) 
188 0.039  0.027  0.003  0.113 
Fraction Affected Maximum 
(FA_max) 
188 0.055  0.036  0.003  0.138 
Employment Rate           
Male, 15-19  235  0.162  0.028  0.097  0.240 
Male, 20-24  235  0.751  0.072  0.552  0.895 
Male, 60-  235  0.490  0.052  0.341  0.635 
Female, 15-19  235  0.155  0.030  0.092  0.239 
Female, 20-24  235  0.721  0.054  0.561  0.863 
Female, 60-  235  0.239  0.043  0.144  0.351 
Female, 25-29, Married  235  0.659  0.104  0.415  0.858 
Change in Employment Rate           
Male, 15-19  188  -0.005 0.028  -0.083  0.063 
Male, 20-24  188  -0.021 0.044  -0.134  0.095 
Male, 60-  188  -0.019 0.036  -0.113  0.077 
Female, 15-19  188  -0.005 0.028  -0.079  0.065 
Female, 20-24  188  -0.007 0.039  -0.108  0.131 
Female, 60-  188  -0.007 0.021  -0.054  0.040 
Female, 25-29, Married  188  0.051  0.071  -0.032  0.298 
Share of Population           
Male, 15-19  235  0.040  0.006  0.028  0.061 
Male, 20-24  235  0.034  0.008  0.020  0.059 
Male, 60-  235  0.112  0.026  0.053  0.165 
Female, 15-19  235  0.039  0.006  0.026  0.057 
Female, 20-24  235  0.037  0.007  0.023  0.053 
Female, 60-  235  0.150  0.035  0.071  0.231 
Female, 25-29, Married  235  0.216  0.079  0.047  0.308 
Change in Share of Population           
Male, 15-19  188  -0.002 0.005  -0.017  0.012 
Male, 20-24  188  -0.001 0.006  -0.018  0.011 
Male, 60-  188  0.016  0.006  0.003  0.032 
Female, 15-19  188  -0.002 0.005  -0.017  0.012 
Female, 20-24  188  -0.002 0.005  -0.017  0.010  36
Female, 60-  188  0.019  0.007  0.004  0.037 
Female, 25-29, Married  188  -0.054 0.061  -0.180  -0.006 
Change in Average Wage    188  0.318  0.443  -0.575  1.137 
Unemployment Rate           
Change in Unemployment Rate  188  0.006  0.011  -0.016  0.030 
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Table 7: Fraction of Workers Affected by Minimum-Wage Hike (%).   
Year 1982-1987  1997-2002  Year 1982-19877  1997-2002
Hokkaido  3.18  0.81  Shiga  2.48  0.27 
Aomori  6.22  4.15  Kyoto  6.19  1.34 
Iwate  6.55  4.47  Osaka  5.32  0.98 
Miyagi  4.63  0.52  Hyogo  5.76  1.11 
Akita  6.27  3.46  Nara  2.20  0.26 
Yamagata  6.72  3.07  Wakayama  2.93  0.53 
Fukushima  5.54  1.37  Tottori  5.25  1.50 
Ibaraki  2.27  0.36  Shimane  5.21  1.95 
Tochigi  3.11  0.37  Okayama  2.60  0.53 
Gunma  3.00  0.38  Hiroshima  2.72  0.52 
Saitama  4.59  0.77  Yamaguchi  3.28  0.62 
Chiba  4.74  0.75  Tokushima  5.19  0.65 
Tokyo  2.98  0.71  Kagawa  4.36  0.80 
Kanagawa  3.65  0.70  Ehime  5.15  0.60 
Niigata  4.50  0.50  Kochi  5.56  0.51 
Toyama  3.18  0.38  Fukuoka  2.95  0.68 
Ishikawa  3.76  0.63  Saga  5.80  3.66 
Fukui  3.98  0.50  Nagasaki  5.27  4.04 
Yamanashi  2.92  0.60  Kumamoto  6.92  3.55 
Nagano  2.74  0.51  Oita  5.02  3.72 
Gifu  3.90  1.40  Miyazaki  6.87  4.34 
Shizuoka  2.66  1.12  Kagoshima  5.88  4.03 
Aichi  6.27  0.94  Okinawa  6.09  4.54 
Mie  3.17  1.18      
Note: The fraction of workers affected by the minimum-wage hike (FA) is defined as the 




+ < ≤ it it it MWincome Income MWIncome ) divided by the number of employed workers.   
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Table 8A: Fraction of workers affected by the minimum-wage hike and the change of 
employment rate, Male 
Dependent Variable: Change in Employment Rate 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Age Group  15-19  20-25  60- 
FA FA_min  FA_max FA_min FA_max FA_min  FA_max
-0.23 -0.20 -0.26 -0.26 -0.02 -0.00  Fraction Affected 
(0.11) (0.12) (0.15) (0.14) (0.11) (0.11) 
0.43 0.08 -1.31 -1.34 0.14 0.15  Change in Population 
Share  (0.60) (0.58) (0.84) (0.82) (0.36) (0.36) 
0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02  Change in Average 
Wage  (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
-0.72 -0.70 -0.33 -0.27 -0.89 -0.88  Change in 
Unemployment Rate  (0.45) (0.47) (0.71) (0.70) (0.39) (0.38) 
Constant  0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 -0.04  -0.04 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) 
Dummy  for  Year  Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations  188 188 188 188 188 188 
R-squared  0.35 0.35 0.34 0.35 0.69 0.69 
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. The inverse of the estimated variance of 
the dependent variable is used as a weight for the weighted least squares estimation.  39
Table 8B: Female 
Dependent Variable: Change in Employment Rate 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Age Group  15-19  20-25  60- 
FA FA_min  FA_max FA_min FA_max FA_min  FA_max
-0.37 -0.13 -0.09 -0.23 -0.10 -0.11  Fraction Affected 
(0.10) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.10) (0.08) 
0.49 0.16 -1.43 -1.62 0.01 -0.01  Change in Population 
Share  (0.64) (0.64) (0.79) (0.80) (0.22) (0.22) 
-0.02 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01  Change in Average 
Wage  (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
-0.25 -0.18 0.04 0.05 -0.10 -0.07  Change in 
Unemployment Rate  (0.59) (0.61) (0.54) (0.54) (0.29) (0.29) 
Constant  0.01 0.01 0.03 0.05 -0.03  -0.03 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
Dummy  for  Year  Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations  188 188 188 188 188 188 
R-squared  0.22 0.18 0.50 0.51 0.44 0.45 
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Table 8C: Female, 25-59, married 
Dependent Variable: Change in Employment Rate 
 (1)  (2) 
FA FA_min  FA_max
-0.43 -0.82  Fraction Affected 
(0.13) (0.13) 
0.49 0.81  Change in Population 
Share (0.60)  (0.58) 
-0.03 -0.07  Change in Average 
Wage (0.02)  (0.02) 
-1.32 -1.38  Change in 
Unemployment Rate (0.78)  (0.75) 
Constant 0.11  0.18 
 (0.02)  (0.03) 
Dummy for Year  Y  Y 
Observations 188  188 
R-squared 0.76  0.78 
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Table 9: Summary Statistics of Analysis Sample for High School Age Choice 
  Observations Mean SDM i n  M a x  
In School, Not Employed 235 0.933 0.022 0.851  0.983 
△In School, Not Employed  188 -0.919 0.024 -0.970 -0.847 
Out School, Not Employed 235 0.017 0.008 0.002  0.058 
△Out School, Not Employed  188 0.001 0.008 -0.024 0.028 
In School, Employed 235 0.025 0.018 0.002 0.100 
△In School, Employed  188 -0.004 0.014 -0.054 0.045 
Out School, Employed 235 0.025 0.011 0.006 0.071 
△Out School, Employed  188 -0.011 0.013 -0.062 0.023 
Unemployment Rate  235 0.023 0.012 0.006  0.070 
△Unemployment Rate 188 0.006 0.011 -0.016 0.030 
Population Share Of Age 16-17  235 0.047 0.010 0.028  0.075 
△Population Share Of Age 16-17  188 -0.002 0.005 -0.011 0.011 
Average Wage 235 2.950 0.718 1.637  4.613 
Change in Average Wage   188 0.318 0.443 -0.575  1.137 
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Table 10: Effect of Minimum Wage on Choices among High-School-Age Teenagers 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6)
5 Year Change in 
State 




Out of School 
Employed 
FA variable  FA_min FA_max FA_min FA_max FA_min FA_max
-0.00 0.04 0.27 0.30 0.11 0.13 Fraction Affected 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04)
-0.17 -0.15 -0.08 0.38 0.04  0.24 Change in Population 
Share 
(0.26) (0.25) (0.35) (0.32) (0.34) (0.33)
0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.02  -0.01 Change in Average 
Wage 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
0.07 0.07 0.20 0.17 0.01 0.00 Change in 
Unemployment Rate 
(0.14) (0.14) (0.21) (0.22) (0.20) (0.20)
Constant  0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 -0.02
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
Year  dummy  Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations  188 188 188 188 188 188
R-squared  0.11 0.11 0.18 0.22 0.17 0.18
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Notes:  
1. Minimum-wage income is defined as annual income that is earned if an individual works 
at the minimum wage all year, by multiplying the minimum wage by minimum value of 
weekly hours and annual work-days. 
2. Workers earning more than 3 times as much as minimum wage annual earnings are not 



























Time Series of FMW & Kaiz
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Time Series of FMW & Kaiz: Okinawa
 
























































FMW among Junior High School & High School Graduates
 


























FMW among Junior High School & High School Graduates
  48
Figure 5A: Fraction of Workers Affected by the Minimum-Wage Hike and Change of Employment Rate, 

































































































Fraction Affected, Regression Adjusted
Change in Employment Rate Fitted Value
Male, 15-19
Change in Employment Rate and FA, 1997-2002
 
Figure 5B: Fraction of Workers Affected by the Minimum-Wage Hike and Change of Employment Rate, 

































































































Fraction Affected, Regression Adjusted
Change in Employment Rate Fitted Value
Female, 15-19
Change in Employment Rate and FA, 1997-2002
 